The standard set-theoretic formalization of classical mathematics is inadequate in the sense that it neglects the constructive aspect of ordinary mathematical practice. (For an extended argument to this effect, see [5].) Even classical mathematicians with no constructivistic scruples discuss what they can construct or compute. In a number of papers, including especially [3], I have proposed that epistemic theories be used as alternative formalizations of classical mathematics in which its constructive component can be given adequate explicit expression. To show that this proposal makes sense, it must be established that epistemic theories behave appropriately. For example, it must be shown that we cannot prove in epistemic set theory that there is a discontinuous function which we know to be effective. That is the main result of this paper.
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Much of the work reported here was first described in the preprint "Booleanvalued models of epistemic set theory" referred to in Flagg [l] and in Scedrov [lo] . Both Flagg and Scedrov use constructions closely related to the one we present. Scedrov, in fact, gives a considerable generalization. Nevertheless, both the details of the construction and the independence results derived from it are published for the first time here. These results are the most striking examples yet of the general phenomenon that familiar theorems about intuitionistic theories can be generalized to the corresponding epistemic theories (for a brief discussion and examples, see Goodman [4] ).
The embedding of intuitionistic logic into S4 is not superficial. It induces interpretations of intuitionistic theories in epistemic theories which preserve the deep proof-theoretic structure of the constructive theories. Moreover, the new results are stronger than the familiar facts about intuitionistic theories that they generalize. For example, the formula @(f, X) of Theorem 6 below need not be the interpretation of any intuitionistically meaningful formula. Using Flagg [l] it can be shown that some of the familiar results of Scott [12] , as extended to intuitionistic set theory, are corollaries of our theorem. The converse is not true. Thus the study of strong epistemic theories displays more of the power of the methods used than can be seen when we restrict attention to the usual constructive theories.
